Add OIDC browser approval and PKCE session handoff for pages CLI
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Anya Tokugawa committed 2026-11-01 20:26:45 +09:00
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commit 60f5fb1881
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package store
import (
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"database/sql"
"encoding/hex"
"errors"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"pageswiki/internal/db"
)
var cliAuthMigrations = []db.SQLMigration{{Version: 1, Name: "cli_oidc_handoff", Statements: []string{
`CREATE TABLE auth_cli_requests (
id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, domain_uuid TEXT NOT NULL, origin TEXT NOT NULL,
device_hash TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE, challenge TEXT NOT NULL, code_hash TEXT NOT NULL,
state TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'pending', browser_hash TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
principal_uuid TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '', mfa_level INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, attempts INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, oidc_attempts INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
created_ms INTEGER NOT NULL, expires_ms INTEGER NOT NULL, next_poll_ms INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0)`,
`CREATE INDEX auth_cli_domain_created ON auth_cli_requests(domain_uuid,created_ms)`,
`CREATE INDEX auth_cli_expiry ON auth_cli_requests(expires_ms)`,
}, Assertions: []string{
schemaColumns("auth_cli_requests", "id,domain_uuid,origin,device_hash,challenge,code_hash,state,browser_hash,principal_uuid,mfa_level,attempts,oidc_attempts,created_ms,expires_ms,next_poll_ms"),
schemaUnique("auth_cli_requests", "id"), schemaUnique("auth_cli_requests", "device_hash"),
schemaIndex("auth_cli_requests", "auth_cli_domain_created", "domain_uuid,created_ms"),
schemaIndex("auth_cli_requests", "auth_cli_expiry", "expires_ms"),
}}}
var (
ErrCLIPending = errors.New("authorization_pending")
ErrCLISlowDown = errors.New("slow_down")
ErrCLIExpired = errors.New("expired_token")
ErrCLILimit = errors.New("too_many_requests")
)
type CLIAuthRequest struct {
ID, Origin, State, BrowserHash, PrincipalUUID string
ExpiresMS int64
}
// Admission is one write statement; concurrent unauthenticated requests cannot
// race the caps. Requests are retained for ten minutes for issuance accounting.
func (s *Store) StartCLIAuth(ctx context.Context, domain, origin, challenge string) (id, device, code string, err error) {
if s.ReadOnly {
return "", "", "", ErrReadOnly
}
id, _, err = authToken()
if err != nil {
return
}
device, _, err = authToken()
if err != nil {
return
}
var raw [4]byte
if _, err = rand.Read(raw[:]); err != nil {
return
}
code = strings.ToUpper(hex.EncodeToString(raw[:]))
now := time.Now().UnixMilli()
_, err = s.DB.ExecContext(ctx, `DELETE FROM auth_cli_requests WHERE expires_ms<?`, now-5*60*1000)
if err != nil {
return
}
var result sql.Result
result, err = s.DB.ExecContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO auth_cli_requests(id,domain_uuid,origin,device_hash,challenge,code_hash,created_ms,expires_ms)
SELECT ?,?,?,?,?,?,?,? WHERE (SELECT count(*) FROM auth_cli_requests)<4096
AND (SELECT count(*) FROM auth_cli_requests WHERE domain_uuid=? AND created_ms>?)<64`,
id, domain, origin, hashAuthToken(device), challenge, hashAuthToken(code), now, now+300000, domain, now-300000)
if err == nil {
if n, e := result.RowsAffected(); e != nil {
err = e
} else if n != 1 {
err = ErrCLILimit
}
}
return
}
func (s *Store) CLIAuthRequest(ctx context.Context, domain, origin, id string) (*CLIAuthRequest, error) {
var grant CLIAuthRequest
err := s.DB.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT id,origin,state,browser_hash,principal_uuid,expires_ms FROM auth_cli_requests WHERE id=? AND domain_uuid=? AND origin=? AND expires_ms>?`, id, domain, origin, time.Now().UnixMilli()).Scan(&grant.ID, &grant.Origin, &grant.State, &grant.BrowserHash, &grant.PrincipalUUID, &grant.ExpiresMS)
if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
return nil, ErrCLIExpired
}
return &grant, err
}
func (s *Store) BeginCLIAuth(ctx context.Context, domain, origin, id string) error {
if s.ReadOnly {
return ErrReadOnly
}
result, err := s.DB.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE auth_cli_requests SET oidc_attempts=oidc_attempts+1 WHERE id=? AND domain_uuid=? AND origin=? AND state='pending' AND browser_hash='' AND expires_ms>? AND oidc_attempts<3`, id, domain, origin, time.Now().UnixMilli())
return cliChanged(result, err)
}
// Only the verified OIDC callback calls this method. The first successful
// browser wins; another browser cannot rebind an in-flight approval.
func (s *Store) BindCLIAuth(ctx context.Context, domain, origin, id, browser string) error {
if s.ReadOnly || !strings.HasPrefix(browser, "pw_browser_") {
return ErrAccessDenied
}
now := time.Now().UnixMilli()
result, err := s.DB.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE auth_cli_requests SET browser_hash=?,principal_uuid=(SELECT principal_uuid FROM auth_sessions WHERE token_hash=?)
WHERE id=? AND domain_uuid=? AND origin=? AND state='pending' AND browser_hash='' AND expires_ms>?
AND EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM auth_sessions WHERE token_hash=? AND domain_uuid=? AND revoked_at_ms=0 AND expires_at_ms>?)`, hashAuthToken(browser), hashAuthToken(browser), id, domain, origin, now, hashAuthToken(browser), domain, now)
return cliChanged(result, err)
}
func cliChanged(result sql.Result, err error) error {
if err != nil {
return err
}
n, err := result.RowsAffected()
if err != nil {
return err
}
if n != 1 {
return ErrAccessDenied
}
return nil
}
// The browser token, confirmation code and current membership are all checked
// at mutation time. Attempts are spent before checking TOTP to bound guessing.
func (s *Store) DecideCLIAuth(ctx context.Context, domain, origin, id, browser, code, totp string, approve bool) error {
if s.ReadOnly || !strings.HasPrefix(browser, "pw_browser_") {
return ErrAccessDenied
}
now := time.Now().UnixMilli()
var principal, expectedCode string
err := s.DB.QueryRowContext(ctx, `UPDATE auth_cli_requests SET attempts=attempts+1
WHERE id=? AND domain_uuid=? AND origin=? AND state='pending' AND browser_hash=? AND attempts<5 AND expires_ms>?
RETURNING principal_uuid,code_hash`, id, domain, origin, hashAuthToken(browser), now).Scan(&principal, &expectedCode)
if err != nil {
return ErrAccessDenied
}
level := 0
if approve {
if hashAuthToken(strings.ToUpper(strings.ReplaceAll(strings.TrimSpace(code), "-", ""))) != expectedCode {
return ErrAccessDenied
}
// Query errors must not silently bypass enrolled MFA.
var has int
if err := s.DB.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT count(*) FROM auth_credentials WHERE principal_uuid=? AND kind='totp' AND enabled=1`, principal).Scan(&has); err != nil {
return err
}
if has > 0 {
if err := s.VerifyTOTP(principal, totp); err != nil {
return ErrAccessDenied
}
level = 1
}
}
state := "denied"
if approve {
state = "approved"
}
result, err := s.DB.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE auth_cli_requests SET state=?,mfa_level=? WHERE id=? AND domain_uuid=? AND state='pending' AND browser_hash=? AND expires_ms>?
AND EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM auth_sessions a JOIN principals p ON p.uuid=a.principal_uuid JOIN domain_memberships m ON m.principal_uuid=p.uuid AND m.domain_uuid=a.domain_uuid
WHERE a.token_hash=? AND a.domain_uuid=? AND a.revoked_at_ms=0 AND a.expires_at_ms>? AND p.state IN ('active','readonly') AND m.state='active')`, state, level, id, domain, hashAuthToken(browser), now, hashAuthToken(browser), domain, now)
if err = cliChanged(result, err); err != nil {
return err
}
return err
}
// Poll and exchange start with a write, avoiding a WAL read-to-write upgrade.
// Grant consumption and API-session creation commit together. No replay on a
// lost HTTP response: a new login is required (no credential stored in grant).
func (s *Store) ExchangeCLIAuth(ctx context.Context, domain, origin, device, verifier string) (token, username string, expires int64, err error) {
if s.ReadOnly {
err = ErrReadOnly
return
}
now := time.Now().UnixMilli()
lifetime := s.AuthSessionLifetime(domain).Milliseconds()
tx, err := s.DB.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
if err != nil {
return
}
defer tx.Rollback()
var id, state, browser string
err = tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `UPDATE auth_cli_requests SET next_poll_ms=?,state=CASE WHEN state='approved' THEN 'consumed' ELSE state END
WHERE device_hash=? AND challenge=? AND domain_uuid=? AND origin=? AND expires_ms>? AND next_poll_ms<=? AND state IN ('pending','approved','denied')
RETURNING id,state,browser_hash`, now+5000, hashAuthToken(device), hashAuthToken(verifier), domain, origin, now, now).Scan(&id, &state, &browser)
if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
var exists int
e := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT count(*) FROM auth_cli_requests WHERE device_hash=? AND challenge=? AND domain_uuid=? AND origin=? AND expires_ms>? AND state IN ('pending','approved','denied')`, hashAuthToken(device), hashAuthToken(verifier), domain, origin, now).Scan(&exists)
if e != nil {
err = e
} else if exists > 0 {
err = ErrCLISlowDown
} else {
err = ErrCLIExpired
}
return
}
if err != nil {
return
}
if state != "consumed" {
err = tx.Commit()
if err == nil {
if state == "denied" {
err = ErrAccessDenied
} else {
err = ErrCLIPending
}
}
return
}
var raw string
raw, _, err = authToken()
if err != nil {
return
}
token = "pw_api_" + raw
// A disabled user, removed membership or revoked browser cannot delegate.
err = tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO auth_sessions(uuid,token_hash,principal_uuid,domain_uuid,auth_time_ms,expires_at_ms,last_seen_at_ms,mfa_level)
SELECT ?,?,p.uuid,a.domain_uuid,a.auth_time_ms,min(?,a.expires_at_ms),?,max(a.mfa_level,g.mfa_level)
FROM auth_cli_requests g JOIN auth_sessions a ON a.token_hash=g.browser_hash JOIN principals p ON p.uuid=a.principal_uuid JOIN domain_memberships m ON m.principal_uuid=p.uuid AND m.domain_uuid=a.domain_uuid
WHERE a.token_hash=? AND a.domain_uuid=? AND a.revoked_at_ms=0 AND a.expires_at_ms>? AND p.state IN ('active','readonly') AND m.state='active'
AND g.id=? AND (g.mfa_level>0 OR NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM auth_credentials WHERE principal_uuid=p.uuid AND kind='totp' AND enabled=1))
RETURNING principal_uuid,expires_at_ms`, uuid.NewString(), hashAuthToken(token), now+lifetime, now, browser, domain, now, id).Scan(&username, &expires)
if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
err = ErrAccessDenied
}
if err != nil {
token = ""
return
}
var name string
err = tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT COALESCE((SELECT subject FROM principal_identities WHERE principal_uuid=? AND provider_type='password' LIMIT 1),?)`, username, username).Scan(&name)
if err != nil {
token = ""
return
}
username = name
err = tx.Commit()
if err != nil {
token = ""
}
return
}