Capture accumulated application, UI, CLI, regression tests and design documentation changes, including task project mapping and default CalDAV list naming. Keep deployment data, backups, local credentials and build artifacts out of Git. Move the Compose enrollment token to an ignored local environment file.
11 KiB
User/group access and approved anonymous publication
Implemented first slice, 2026-09-14. This extends, rather than replaces,
locality governance and
endpoint authorization. No production ACL or public
approval is installed automatically. Existing legacy domains remain legacy;
configuration of these controls requires authorization_mode=enforcing.
2026-09-16 update: public navigation supersedes the navigation-disabled first-slice restrictions below for children, tree, City Map and locality links. Normal public Pages are navigable and have no download button; a navigation-free view is reserved for share URLs. Approval-policy inheritance and reviewer Inbox are design/TODO only.
Authenticated user/group permissions
Domain, Quartier, Street and Spot governance dialogs expose a separate access
form. inherit adds no restriction; restricted selects up to 64 local users
or groups. Empty selection denies non-administrative content access.
| Setting | Newly granted content capabilities | Not newly granted |
|---|---|---|
| Read only | read | all mutations |
| Read/write | read, write, create, upload | delete, rename, link, manage, ownership |
This locality selector is deliberately narrower than the existing group-wide
read_write profile (which also includes rename/link). Existing grants continue
to supply their original capabilities, subject to locality restrictions and the
temporary namespace fences below. Do not interpret it as an administrator role.
- Matching subjects at one locality form a union. Every applicable ancestor restriction is then intersected. A child cannot grant write through a read-only parent or grant access to a subject excluded by a parent.
- A Domain administrator can establish a positive grant. A delegated owner can restrict existing/ancestor-granted rights, not invent a new positive grant.
- Policy authority is retained: Domain admin = 3, Quartier owner = 2, Spot owner = 1. A subordinate editing a superior-authored policy may remove subjects or downgrade read/write to read, but cannot clear it, add subjects, or promote read to read/write. Such narrowing retains the superior grant/rank.
- Active built-in Domain administrators bypass locality content caps for recovery, but still require their underlying capability grants. Ordinary members of an administrative group are not automatically administrators.
- Usernames resolve to stable local membership IDs; group names resolve to stable group IDs. Name reuse must not transfer rights. Supplied IDs must agree with resolved names. Group membership, account state and Domain membership are re-evaluated on the next request, not held in a global cache. Readonly principals cannot gain write from a matching group.
- The initial username picker resolves password-type username identities; external-only identities need a local username identity before selection.
- Object/raw/history access intersects the restrictive caps on all local aliases, even when an Object grant or a different readable alias exists. Listings use a bounded request-scoped snapshot; no positive Object grant reveals otherwise hidden semantic aliases. Exact foreign Object grants also cannot bypass a restricted source-Domain binding; cross-Domain delegation of these new ACLs is not implemented.
- Saves recheck active governance authority and epoch/topology in a reserved SQLite write transaction and append local before/after audit records. Content operations already authorized/in flight are not recalled; this is not a distributed linearizable revocation protocol.
GET/PATCH /_/api/v1/city/{domains,zones,spots}/{uuid}/governance/access
uses epoch, topology_version, mode, and entries containing
kind: user|group, name, permission: read|read_write, optional stable id.
Readonly scope, authority rank and grant flags are computed server-side.
Missing/stale versions fail; client fields cannot assert administrator status.
Temporary namespace guard (important operational limitation)
Applying a restriction is refused when an in-scope Object already has aliases outside that scope or in another Domain. Resolve these bindings first. SQLite guards apply to CLI/import/direct-store paths as well as HTTP:
- Protected Path move, removal and rebinding are refused, as is adding an existing Object inside a restricted scope or aliasing a protected Object out.
- New Objects may receive their first Path and revision normally.
- City parent/path/state changes and deletions in an ACL-bearing Domain are blocked, including Street–Spot membership changes. Title-only changes remain possible. Automatic/import City mapping may therefore be refused; this is a fail-closed guard, not a completed impact-aware reconciliation workflow.
- Enforcing mode cannot be disabled while restrictions exist.
Do not work around these guards by silently dropping ACLs. A Domain admin can explicitly remove restrictions, but that changes access and needs deliberate review. Replacing this coarse guard with atomic, impact-reviewed mutations is the next priority.
Anonymous current-content approvals
A public Domain ceiling merely permits publication. A local public policy within all ancestor ceilings supplies intent; saving it alone publishes nothing. The dialog's anonymous section offers target enumeration, explicit approval, and revocation. It warns that external caches cannot be recalled.
GET /_/api/v1/city/{domains,zones,spots}/{uuid}/governance/publication
returns an impact token, epoch/topology version, eligible current
Path/Object/Revision/SHA-256/language tuples and excluded Paths. Domain itself
is not publishable. A candidate is excluded if it has any aliases, is in a
reserved namespace, or is under either a user/group restriction or a local
authenticated-only ceiling. The actor must be able to read every candidate;
governance authority alone cannot enumerate/publish another user's secrets.
The metadata-only preview is bounded to 512 Paths, 32 language heads per Object, 2048 entries and three seconds. Exceeding a limit rejects the whole approval; there is no silently truncated approval. The digest includes actor, Domain, scope, versions, entries and exclusions. It is a concurrency commitment, not a bearer credential. An authorized actor must still approve it.
PATCH .../publication receives epoch, topology_version, publication_version, enabled,
impact_token, confirm. Activation reserves the SQL writer, checks current
authority, regenerates impact and compares the digest before writing one atomic
manifest. A per-scope publication generation advances on both approval and
revocation, so pre-revocation consent cannot be replayed to publish again.
Revocation does not need impact enumeration or read access to all
old contents, so an oversized/now-restricted manifest remains revocable.
- Approval binds only current immutable revisions, never future edits or new descendants. All language heads in the preview are included explicitly.
- Ordinary Page edits withdraw the affected language entry; Path binding/alias changes withdraw the Object's entries. Restoring an old binding does not silently revive approval. SQLite triggers cover direct store/CLI writes too.
- Governance/ACL/owner changes invalidate all manifests in that Domain through their epoch. City changes invalidate manifests conservatively, including title changes in this first slice. Reapproval is explicit.
- Different scopes may approve the same Path. Revoking one approval removes only that approval; the UI states that another scope may still publish it. An ancestor authenticated-only policy or a user/group restriction invalidates the Domain's approvals and prevents reapproval of the restricted subtree.
- Manifest presence prevents switching the Domain to legacy authorization.
- Revocation controls the next request, including conditional/Range requests. It cannot recall in-flight bytes or copies retained by browsers/crawlers.
Public read surface and exclusions
Only GET/HEAD of a known semantic Page URL or /v/raw/path:{semantic-path}
can use the approved anonymous read path under enforcing mode. It is considered
only when no session cookie or Authorization header exists. Invalid/expired
credentials do not downgrade to anonymous. Valid authenticated requests keep
the authenticated authorization pipeline.
Every read checks enabled host-resolved Domain, live binding, current language
head, approved digest and current governance/topology versions. Lookup is
Path-indexed, metadata-only and limited to two seconds. Raw streaming uses
OpenDocument/ServeContent with Range support and existing identity headers;
it does not hydrate large documents or queue preview generation.
The dedicated themed Viewer includes no private topbar, bookmarks, user menu,
City ancestors or automatic discovery. HTML uses controlled-v2 plus nonce CSP;
code/text is escaped and bounded. Raster images, audio/video and native PDF
frames are supported. Raw HTML/SVG/unknown files are sandboxed attachments.
Responses remain private/no-store, varying on credentials and language.
OGP/X metadata derives only from this approved content and configured Domain
identity; ordinary enforcing responses continue suppressing social metadata.
Not part of this slice: anonymous City/search/browser/children expansion, asset/hash/UUID/revision/history access, derived thumbnails, archive viewers, diagrams, hosted adapters, and dependency manifests. Authored macros remain literal on anonymous HTML pages. Referenced assets are not automatically made public. Restricted user/group scopes are not anonymously publishable: an “everyone can read, selected subjects can write” audience needs a later per-capability audience model (existing write grants remain usable outside a restricted scope). No public production Page is created as a deployment test.
Follow-up tasks
- Transactional impact-aware move/merge/import/reconciliation, replacing the coarse authenticated namespace freeze without weakening restrictions.
- Atomic per-content-operation authorization snapshots where still checked before mutation; bounded grant evaluation with large policy catalogs.
- Stable local usernames for external-only identities and bounded group name autocomplete; stale/deleted subject diagnostics and orphan cleanup.
- Per-capability audiences (anonymous read plus named writers), preview of effective inherited user/group membership, and privilege-impact confirmation.
- Dependency-aware anonymous children/City/search/media projections and shared assets, retaining exact source/alias authority and revocation.
- Paginated manifest review for larger sites, targeted epoch invalidation, publication expiry/status monitoring and approval co-ownership visibility.
- Domain-sequenced transactional outbox and federated ACL/approval protocol; new local ACL tables are not implicitly exported by current group inheritance.
Tests: TestLocalityUserGroupAccess, TestAnonymousApprovedPublication,
TestCityGovernanceChromium, TestAnonymousPublicationChromium, existing
governance concurrency, HTML/browser/auth/read-policy and full regression suites.